A 3D object encryption scheme which maintains dimensional and spatial stability by Jolfaei, Alireza et al.
 
 
COPYRIGHT NOTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
FedUni ResearchOnline 
https://researchonline.federation.edu.au 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2014 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE 
must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including 
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new 
collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted 
component of this work in other works. 
 
This is the peer-reviewed version of the following article: 
 
Jolfaei, A., Wu, X., Muthukkumarasamy, V. (2015) A 3D object encryption 
scheme which maintains dimensional and special stability. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. Vol. 10, no. 2 
(2015), p. 409-422. 
 
Which has been published in final form at: 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2378146 
 
1556-6013 (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2014.2378146, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
 1 
Abstract— Due to widespread applications of three-
dimensional (3D) vision technology, the research into 3D object 
protection is primarily important. To maintain confidentiality, 
encryption of 3D objects is essential. However, the requirements 
and limitations imposed by 3D objects indicate the impropriety of 
conventional cryptosystems for 3D object encryption. This 
suggests the necessity of designing new ciphers. In addition, the 
study of prior works indicates that the majority of problems 
encountered with encrypting 3D objects are about point cloud 
protection, dimensional and spatial stability, and robustness 
against surface reconstruction attacks. To address these 
problems, this paper proposes a 3D object encryption scheme, 
based on a series of random permutations and rotations, which 
deform the geometry of the point cloud. Since the inverse of a 
permutation and a rotation matrix is its transpose, the decryption 
implementation is very efficient. Our statistical analyses show 
that within the cipher point cloud, points are randomly 
distributed. Furthermore, the proposed cipher leaks no 
information regarding the geometric structure of the plain point 
cloud, and is also highly sensitive to the changes of the plaintext 
and secret key. The theoretical and experimental analyses 
demonstrate the security, effectiveness and robustness of the 
proposed cipher against surface reconstruction attacks.  
 
Index Terms—3D object encryption, geometry deformation, 
permutation, geometric rotation, cryptanalysis, statistical analysis 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
DVANCES of multimedia computing and networking have 
unlocked the path for the application of 3D objects in a 
variety of domains, including virtual reality and augmented 
reality. The fast growing demand for high definition 
visualization applications has opened up a number of 
challenges regarding the confidentiality of 3D objects. Secure 
communication of 3D objects is a legitimate concern of 
Intellectual Property (IP) owners, developers, government 
regulatory bodies and law enforcement agencies. Thus, there 
is a strong need to protect 3D objects against unauthorized use 
or other security violations. To maintain confidentiality of 3D 
objects, encryption is essential.  
Since the 1970s, a large number of encryption schemes 
have been proposed, among which some have been 
standardized and widely adopted all over the world, such as 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) [1] and Advanced Encryption 
Standard (AES) [2]. Thus, it seems natural to use established 
and tested ciphers to encrypt 3D objects bit by bit. This simple 
and naïve approach has already been used in many Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) systems [3], [4]. For instance, in 
Extensible Markup Language (XML) encryption [5], the 
content of the XML elements is considered as a binary stream 
and thus, while keeping the syntax format, it is encrypted by 
conventional ciphers. This approach provides the same level 
of security as that of the conventionally used cipher. It also 
offers granularity. In other words, users can choose to encrypt 
only a few of many objects in a complicated 3D scene. 
However, due to special features of 3D objects, naïve 
encryption may not be a suitable solution for many 3D 
applications. The problem of 3D object encryption is beyond 
the application of established and well-known encryption 
algorithms. This is primarily due to the structure of 3D objects 
and the way they are used commercially. Unlike data 
encryption, where a complete bitstream is encrypted, 3D 
content encryption introduces several challenges.  
In comparison with 1D and 2D data, 3D objects imply a 
higher level representation or semantics. 3D objects have a 3D 
geometry and in many applications, such as socializing 
metaverses and games, there is a requirement to display such 
geometry in a 3D space. Hence, 3D objects should be confined to 
a virtual space in order to be displayed. If such consideration 
is not taken into account, then encrypted objects may exceed 
the viewing screen resolution or they may overlap with other 
objects of the virtual world. Hence, the encryption outcome 
may conceal other objects behind its surface. This decreases 
users’ observation capability. Conventional ciphers, such as 
AES, are oblivious to dimensional and spatial stability of 3D 
objects and hence, the rendering may spill out the encrypted 
outcome from the intended size and location, and corrupt the 
whole 3D scene. In practical terms, conventional ciphers 
destroy the spatial and dimensional stability. It can be argued 
that the encrypted content may not require rendering and it 
would be better to display nothing. This may not be an ideal 
solution. In many applications, such as in virtual museums and 
3D e-commerce, if users have no means of noticing that 
something is missing, it is then unlikely that they will find that 
something is missing. In practical terms, the motivation to pay 
for having access to 3D content would be lacking. 
An example for the dimensional and spatial stability 
requirement is the case of a game production workflow where 
a crew of level designers, artists and programmers cooperate 
under the supervision of a producer. The output of the 
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production workflow is a game program and a series of game 
assets to be consumed by the game program.  These assets include 
3D models and images data. The 3D designs are normally  
updated during the production workflow. For instance, some 
parts or textures can be added to or added from a particular 
object. In the production workflow, the design studio may not 
be willing to give access to the full scene to a particular crew.  
However, this crew may need to have access to visual cues in 
order to insert graphical elements without striking existing ones 
that would be invisible because of the protection framework.  
3D objects have different kinds of representations 
depending on the type of 3D scanning device used. For 
instance, 3D laser scanners produce a cloud of points while 
Computed Tomography (CT) scanners create a volumetric 
model in the form of a 3D cube. In addition, different 3D 
applications, such as medical applications and Computer-Aided 
Design (CAD), use different representations. In this paper, we 
focus on point cloud model. Over the last decade, point clouds 
have gained more attention [6] and have been used for a 
multitude of modeling tasks, such as editing [7] and compression 
[8]. The reason for this popularity is that the point cloud 
representation offers several advantages compared to other 3D 
object representations. Firstly, it is an explicit method of 
demonstrating the 3D raw data captured by 3D sensors. This 
representation is also simple and flexible, and does not require 
any information about connectivity or topological consistency. 
Hence, it can be directly used as a rendering primitive to 
circumvent the need for difficult surface construction 
procedures. Moreover, it is very efficient when the available 
point data density exceeds the viewing screen resolution [9], 
because there is no need to maintain, store and render the 
polygons associated with the edge of the off-screen mesh. 
More importantly, other 3D representations, such as polygon 
soups and meshes, can be easily converted into point clouds 
by sampling. Therefore, methods applied on the point cloud 
representation can be extended to other 3D representations.  
In this paper, we propose a chaos-based symmetric encryption 
scheme for protecting 3D objects. Firstly, due to the large 
amount of data involved in a 3D object, it requires a huge 
storage capacity and transmission bandwidth. To provide a better 
execution performance, we consider symmetric (rather than 
asymmetric) encryption. Secondly, chaos-based cryptographic 
primitives have a number of advantages as shown in [10], such 
as the sensitivity to input data. Chaos has been used to design 
encryption schemes for multimedia data [11], such as image and 
video. However, these image and video encryption schemes are 
not applicable to 3D object encryption due to the 3D geometry 
and representation, as explained in the above discussion.  
The proposed cipher employs random permutation matrices 
and random geometric rotations to deform the geometry of 3D 
objects. Permutation and rotation are linear transformations 
represented by orthogonal matrices. Since the inverse of an 
orthogonal matrix is its transpose, no extra calculation is 
required to implement the decryption procedure which is 
based on the inverse matrix. This remarkable property makes 
the implementation of decryption very efficient. 
An overview of previous studies in the area of 3D object 
protection demonstrates that this research is mainly focused on 
3D digital watermarking and is in an effort to pinpoint the 
source of leaks (traitor tracing) [12], [13]. However, digital 
watermarking is a complement to encryption and one can 
never be used to replace the other. To prevent unauthorized 
users from accessing valuable 3D content, secure encryption 
schemes need to be studied. Despite the importance of 3D 
content encryption, few technological solutions have been 
given [14], [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. However, the method 
proposed in [14] is not applicable to point cloud representation 
and may leak the point cloud information, and the methods 
proposed in [15], [18] and [19] are not secure as they leak the 
point cloud information and cannot resist surface reconstruction 
attacks. In addition, the method suggested in [16] cannot 
maintain dimensional and spatial stability, and the method 
proposed in [17] is not compatible with standard file formats.  
Following the above discussion, this study addresses the 
major shortcomings of the literature, and gives a technical 
solution to the problem of 3D content encryption, which 
encrypts 3D point cloud based objects making use of 
pseudorandom permutations and geometric rotations. The 
proposed cipher is compatible with standard file formats and 
maintains the semantic requirements of 3D objects, including 
the dimensional and spatial stability. We showed that the 
proposed cipher has a large key space and so is robust against 
brute-force attack. The rigorous security analysis showed no 
statistical weaknesses in the cipher and demonstrated no 
simple method of recovering the secret key. It also confirmed 
the security of the proposed cipher against known/chosen 
plaintext attacks and surface reconstruction attacks. The 
sensitivity analyses indicated that the proposed cipher is 
highly sensitive to the changes of the plaintext and secret key. 
Moreover, a spatial randomness test determined that there is 
no presence of homogenous patterns in the cipher point 
clouds. In addition to security evaluations, a performance 
analysis was performed to evaluate the encryption speed of the 
proposed cipher.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 reviews the related work in 3D object encryption. Section 3 
provides details of the proposed encryption and decryption 
schemes. Section 4 proves that the proposed scheme ensures 
the dimensional and spatial stability of the original content. 
Sections 5 and 6 evaluate the security of the proposed cipher 
using cryptanalysis and statistical methods, respectively. 
Section 7 measures the performance of the proposed cipher by 
calculating its computational complexity and encryption/ 
decryption time. Finally, Section 8 concludes that the proposed 
scheme is secure, efficient and feasible.  
II. RELATED WORK 
To address the confidentiality problem of 3D objects, 
several researchers proposed a number of initial solutions. 
These solutions are briefly described as follows. In [14], 
Koller et al. investigated several possible protection methods 
for ensuring the security of the high-resolution geometric 
details of 3D objects in the underlying 3D graphics system. 
Based on this investigation, they developed a remote rendering 
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system, which included a 3D viewer client and a rendering 
server, appropriate for secure distribution of 3D objects. The 
rendering server used a number of defensive approaches, such 
as monitoring and limiting request streams, to protect the 3D 
geometry from unauthorized extraction. The Koller et al.’s 
approach protects geometric detail of 3D objects by rendering 
a lower resolution version (fewer polygon surfaces) of 3D 
models to unauthorized users. In this method, what users see is 
the snapshots of the rendering results in the rendering server 
rather than the results rendered with the client’s graphics 
pipeline. The advantage of this method is that the transmission 
of sequence of images, rather than 3D models, reduces startup 
latency on the client side. Thus, protected objects can be 
displayed quickly. However, displaying 2D images of low 
resolution 3D models can locally leak the surface information. 
Therefore, to increase the scheme’s resistance to surface 
reconstruction methods, such as shape-from-silhouette attacks 
[20] and shape-from-shading attacks [21], Koller et al. applied 
particular perturbation and distortion mechanisms, such as 
perturbing the viewing and lighting parameters, and adding 
noise to the rendered images. Although these defensive 
mechanisms can reduce the amount of surface information 
leaked from 2D images, they cannot completely protect the 
point clouds’ vertex information. For instance, if the server’s 
3D graphics system ignores the facets rendering, then the 
vertices of the 3D object will be revealed. This provides 
enough information to the potential adversary to reconstruct 
the surface [22], [23]. In addition, as the encryption/decryption 
process is handled within a remote rendering system, this 
method cannot be used to protect the 3D data stream in 
applications running in local computers, such as games.  
In [15], Pan et al. proposed an encryption method based on 
vertex shader programming to protect the transmission of 3D 
models. In this approach, the coordinates of each point are 
permuted by a simple comparison with the average of the 
coordinates. Security of such cipher solely relies on a simple 
permutation of coordinates, and it is therefore easy to break 
the cipher and deduce the original 3D data. As well as the 
mentioned design’s shortcoming, this method has a number of 
drawbacks. Firstly, the proposed distortions may not 
sufficiently distort the 3D object, and hence the underlying 
pattern of the encrypted object would still be distinguishable 
after rendering. This indicates the vulnerability of Pan et al.’s 
scheme to surface reconstruction attacks. In addition, this 
method encrypts all 3D objects which may not be necessary. 
In [16], a digital rights enabled graphics processing system 
was proposed by Shi et al. In this system, firstly the privacy-
sensitive 3D content primitives, including vertices and 
textures, are encrypted by the content provider. Hence, only 
valuable graphics data (not all data) are encrypted. The 
decryption process is then handled within the graphics 
pipeline, under the control of licenses. The encryption and 
decryption are performed using AES in CBC (cipher block 
chaining) or counter mode. This system renders only 3D 
objects with multi-resolution representations, which have 
different levels of detail. By this method, protected and 
unprotected versions of the 3D object primitives can 
simultaneously be delivered. In this method, it is difficult to 
exploit particular properties of a specific 3D object by running 
software exploits or simple hardware-based tampering. 
Although Shi et al.’s system is a real progress towards secure 
3D environments; it cannot render the protected scenes with 
other representation formats due to the interoperability issues. 
In [17], Phelps described a 3D object protection method by 
encrypting the privacy sensitive object and representing a 
dummy object, such as a bounding box, with the same size and 
the same location in lieu. In this method, the dummy object is 
stored as non-encrypted data in one file and the protected 3D 
object as encrypted data in a separate file. Any user may 
access the non-encrypted data, but only authorized users can 
access the encrypted data; non-authorized users see the 
dummy object thereof. This method informs the unauthorized 
users about the location and boundaries of the encrypted 
content. Hence, any content modifications that may lead to 
interference among objects can be avoided. However, this 
method is not compatible with the standard file formats 
because it only works with a specific format that stores 
privacy sensitive objects in two separate files, one file as a 
non-encrypted data (dummy) and the other one as an 
encrypted data. Hence, it is only usable by adapted rendering 
devices, not standard ones. In practical terms, the encrypted 
data does not respect the syntax of most 3D techniques, and 
therefore cannot be widely adopted for any rendering devices.  
In [18] and [19], the Technicolor researchers proposed a 3D 
encryption technique based on vertex coordinates shuffling to 
deform and encrypt 3D content. Similarly to Pan et al.’s 
encryption scheme, Technicolor’s proposal is a permutation-
only cipher. However, it permutes the set of individual 
coordinates of vertices rather than permuting the coordinates 
of each point. A distinct characteristic of Technicolor’s 
encryption scheme is that it keeps the dimensions of the cipher 
object bounded within a box with respect to the bounded 
dimensions of the plain object. Using this approach, the cipher 
object’s dimension cannot exceed the virtual world’s 
dimensions. Thus, the cipher object can be rendered without 
any undesired interference with the objects of the virtual 
world. However, Technicolor’s encryption scheme is not secure 
because the secret key can be easily deduced by a known/  
chosen plaintext attack (see Section 5 for further explanation). 
The study of related works indicate that the major problems 
in 3D object encryption are about point cloud protection, 
dimensional and spatial stability, and robustness against surface 
reconstruction attacks. Therefore, we aim to address these 
problems by proposing an appropriate methodology in Section 3. 
III. PROPOSED ENCRYPTION SCHEME 
In this section, the encryption and decryption procedures of 
the proposed cipher will be described. Before the algorithm 
description, we firstly explain the content-dependent metadata 
employed to ensure the semantic requirements of 3D point 
clouds. 3D point clouds must be placed in designated locations 
and must be confined in limited spaces with defined 
boundaries. Hence, we assume that every point cloud is 
distributed in a bounding sphere of radius r with center G, 
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where, G is the barycenter of the point cloud and r is the 
distance from the farthest vertex to G. In certain 3D content 
applications, such as animation and game production 
workflow, the unauthorized designers may need to know the 
size and position of objects in order to insert graphical 
elements without striking existing ones that would be invisible 
because of the protection framework. Hence, r and G need to 
be discernible to both authorized and unauthorized users. We 
therefore keep r and G as public information and obfuscate 
privacy-sensitive information, that is, point cloud vertices, 
with respect to these public content-dependent metadata.  
To elaborate the steps of the encryption algorithm, let P
1
, 
P
2, …, Pn be points of the plain point cloud, and C1, C2, …, Cn 
be points of the corresponding cipher point cloud. For any j     
(1≤ j ≤ n), Pj and Cj are defined as follows: 
P j = [
𝑝1
𝑗
𝑝2
𝑗
𝑝3
𝑗
] ∈ ℝ3, 𝑝1
𝑗 , 𝑝2
𝑗 , 𝑝3
𝑗 ∈ ℝ, (1) 
C j = [
𝑐1
𝑗
𝑐2
𝑗
𝑐3
𝑗
] ∈ ℝ3, 𝑐1
𝑗 , 𝑐2
𝑗 , 𝑐3
𝑗 ∈ ℝ . (2) 
To achieve the confusion and diffusion properties defined 
by Shannon [24], and to maintain the dimensional and spatial 
stability, we propose an n-round encryption scheme based on a 
combination of a confusion-diffusion structure and 3D 
geometric rotations. As we will analyze later in Section 5, two 
rounds of encryption is enough to have a secure cipher. More 
rounds of encryption give a higher level of security at the price 
of losing efficiency. Without loss of generality, in the 
following subsections, the components used in the encryption 
algorithm as well as the detailed description of the two-round 
encryption algorithm will be given. To illustrate the 
encryption steps, a block diagram of the proposed encryption 
algorithm is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Permutation Geometric RotationP
C
K
Round 1
Pseudorandom Point Generation
Permutation Geometric Rotation
Round 2
Pseudorandom Point Generation
 
Fig. 1.  The structure of the encryption algorithm. 
 
A. Key Scheduling Algorithm 
To encrypt a large number of points, we need to iterate the 
encryption operations several times. Therefore, we first 
present a key scheduling algorithm based on a Chebyshev map 
[25] to expand the relatively short secret key to a large 
expanded key. To avoid simple relationships between the 
secret key and the expanded key stream and to resist certain 
types of cryptanalysis, such as related-key attacks and slide 
attacks, the key schedule algorithm produces different key 
streams for different encryption rounds [26].  
The key scheduling algorithm is described as follows: 
 
= cos (D cos
−1
( )), for 1 ≤ i ≤ 6 and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n,  (3) 
where D is a constant denoting the degree of the Chebyshev 
map, K =  denotes the encryption seed 
point (secret key), and for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6), ∈ . 
B. Pseudorandom Point Generation Process 
To meet the confusion requirements, the relationship 
between the encryption key and the cipher point cloud should 
be made as complex as possible. To this end, in each encryption 
round, n pseudorandom points are generated within the point 
cloud’s sphere of radius √3r with center G, as follows: 
and ,  (4) 
where v represents the encryption round, j represents the point 
index and A
t
 denotes the transpose of matrix A. ( , , ) is 
the seed point for this point generation process. 
C. Permutation process 
To meet the diffusion requirements, the statistical 
relationship between the plain and cipher point clouds should 
be made as complex as possible. To this end, the dimensional 
coordinates of points of the plain point cloud are shuffled with 
the coordinates of pseudorandom 3D points. This dissipates 
any meaningful relationship between the points of the plain 
point cloud. Permutation of a large number of coordinates, for 
instance, all of the dimensional coordinates at once, may not 
be an efficient approach because producing a large-scale 
permutation matrix requires a considerable amount of 
computation, time and memory. In order to increase the 
permutation efficiency of the encryption scheme, permutations 
are locally employed to reorder subsets of the set of all 
dimensional coordinates of the plain-points and pseudorandom 
points specified in the previous subsection. The following 
definitions are given for the one round of the encryption 
scheme to elaborate the permutation process.  
Definition 1. Let   
 denote the permutation keystream.  
Definition 2. Given n plain-points P
j
 and n pseudorandom 
points O
j
, j = 1, …, n, the universal set U  is defined as the set 
of all dimensional coordinates of P
j
 and O
j
, that is,  
U =  and ,  
                                     for 1≤ i ≤ n and 1≤ j ≤ 𝑛}.  
(5) 
 
By definition above, the cardinality of the universal set #U = 6n.  
Remark 1. Given an input array of size 6n, there are (6n)! 
possible permutations for the inputs. To sort this input, any 
deterministic comparison-based sorting algorithm requires 
performing O (n ⋅ log n) comparisons in the worst case [27]. 
To reduce this complexity to O(n) and perform an efficient 
permutation, the universal set is first partitioned into  small 
subsets defined as follows: 
Definition 3. For any m ( ), let Xm denote a subset 
of the universal set U, which is defined as follows: 
 and 
, for 1≤ i ≤ 3 and 1≤ j ≤ 8}.  
(6) 
If 8 ∤ n, the last l plain-points and l pseudorandom points remain 
1556-6013 (c) 2013 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/TIFS.2014.2378146, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
 5 
unclassed, where . In this case, these elements are 
added to the last subset , which is constructed as follows: 
 and 
, for 1≤ i ≤ 3 and 1≤ j ≤ 8 + l},  
(7) 
where . For any m ( ), by definition 
the cardinality of each subset #(Xm) = 48. If 8 | n, then the 
cardinality of the last subset #( ) = 48; otherwise #( ) = 
48 + 6l. Obviously, by definition the following conditions 
hold for the subsets Xm: 
U, (8) 
and 
, for m ≠ n.  (9) 
Remark 2. For any m ( ), permutations are 
performed locally in each subset Xm, where 48 ≤ #(Xm) ≤ 90. 
This makes the permutation more efficient because for each 
subset Xm, there are #(Xm)! possible permutations, and sorting 
the elements of each subset Xm requires O (1) comparisons. 
Therefore, the computational complexity of rearranging the 
elements in all of the  subsets is O (n). This is more efficient 
than the permutation of the whole (6n) elements at once.  
 
 
Remark 3. The design rationale for specifying a particular 
size for the subsets is to achieve resistance to known/chosen 
plaintext attacks by two rounds of encryption. To clarify 
further, see Section 5 for the detail of cryptanalysis. 
Utilizing the definitions above, the permutation process is 
defined as follows. For any m ( ), ∏ :
{𝜋𝑖}𝑖=48(𝑚−1)+1
48(𝑚−1)+48  
, where  
𝑋𝑚
′ = {𝑥𝑗
′|𝑥𝑗
′ ∈ 𝑋𝑚, 𝑥𝑗
′ = ∏ (𝑥𝑗), for{𝜋𝑗} 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 48}.  (10) 
If 8 | n, then for  the same mapping is applied; Otherwise, 
for l (1≤ l ≤ 7), 8 | n – l, ∏ :{𝜋𝑖}𝑖=6(𝑛−𝑙)−47
6𝑛 𝑋
⌊
𝑛
8
⌋
→ 𝑋
⌊
𝑛
8
⌋
′ , where 
𝑋
⌊
𝑛
8
⌋
′ = {𝑥𝑗
′|𝑥𝑗
′ ∈ 𝑋
⌊
𝑛
8
⌋
, 𝑥𝑗
′ = ∏ (𝑥𝑗), for{𝜋𝑗} 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 48 + 𝑙}.  (11) 
The permutation outcome, including the permuted plain point 
cloud P′ = {P′1, P′2, …, P′n} and the permuted pseudorandom 
points O′ = {O′1, O′2, …, O′n}, are obtained as follows. For 
any m ( ), 
 
      8 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 3, , , for 1 8,
tj m
j j jx x x j
 
     
       P  (12) 
   
      8 8 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 3 , ., , for 9 16
tj m
j j jx x x j
  
     
      O  (13) 
If 8 | n, then the above relations hold for m = . If for l (1≤ l ≤ 
7), 8 | n – l, then for m = , the permuted plain point cloud and 
the permuted pseudorandom points are obtained as follows: 
 
      8 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 3, , , for 1 8 ,
tj n l
j j jx x x j l
  
     
         P  (14) 
   
      8 8 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 3, , ,
 for 9 16 2 .
tj n l
j j jx x x
l j l
   
     
  
   

                                             
O  (15) 
 
D. Geometric Rotation Process 
To maintain the dimensional and spatial stability, and also 
to safeguard the confusion-diffusion process from chosen-
plaintext attacks, such as point re-ordering attacks [12], for 
any j (1≤ j ≤ n), the j-th point of P′ is geometrically rotated 
about the j-th point of O′ with random Euler angles  1 2 3, ,j j j   . 
As the inverse of a 3D rotation matrix is equal to its transpose, 
no extra calculation is required to compute the reciprocal 
matrix. This remarkable property in the design of our 
cryptographic algorithm makes the implementation of 
decryption very efficient. The geometric rotation function    
Rot (⋅) is defined as follows: 
K
Rot (P′j) = ψ ⋅ Rj  1 2 3, ,j j j   × [P′j − O′j] + O′j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ n,  (16) 
where K =  denotes the seed point (secret key), and   
R(𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛼3)  is the 3D rotation matrix defined as follows:  
 
 
   
   
 
         
         
   
         
         
   
1 2 3
2 3 1 2 3 1 3
2 3 1 2 3 1 3
2 1 2
1 2 3 1 3
1 2 3 1 3
1 2
, ,
cos cos sin sin cos cos sin
cos sin sin sin sin cos cos
sin sin cos
cos sin cos sin sin
cos sin sin sin cos ,
cos cos
R
 
  
      
      
  
    
    
 
















 
(17) 
0 < ψ ≤  is the scaling factor which is used to adjust the size 
of the rotated point cloud. For any encryption round l (1≤ l ≤ 2), 
Euler angles are obtained as follows: 
, for 1≤ i ≤ 3 and 1≤ j ≤ n.   (18) 
E. Encryption and Decryption Algorithms 
Details of the proposed encryption and decryption 
algorithms are described as pseudo-codes in Algorithm 1 and 
Algorithm 2, respectively. The proposed cipher is based on a 
series of permutations and rotations. Both permutation and 
rotation are linear transformations represented by orthogonal 
matrices. Since the inverse of an orthogonal matrix is its 
transpose, no extra calculation is required to implement the 
decryption procedure which is based on the inverse matrix.  
 
Algorithm 1. Pseudo-code of the encryption algorithm 
Input:    Plain-points P
1
, P
2, …, Pn, content-dependent 
              metadata including r and G, control parameter ψ, and 
              secret key K  
Output: Cipher-points C
1
, C
2, …, Cn  
1:       Generate an expanded key stream using the key       
             scheduling algorithm, as explained in Section 3.A. 
2:       For Round = 1 to 2 
3:              Generate O1, O2, …, On using the pseudorandom   
                    point generation algorithm explained in Section        
                    3.B. 
4:              For m =1 to  
5:                    , as explained in Section 3.C. 
6:                     For j =1 to 8 
7:                            Compute Cj by geometric rotation of P′j     
                                   about O′j, as explained in Section 3.D. 
8:                            Cj → Pj. 
9:                     End 
10:              End    
11:       End 
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Algorithm 2. Pseudo-code of the decryption algorithm 
Input:    Cipher-points C
1
, C
2, …, Cn, content-dependent 
          metadata including r and G, control parameter ψ, and 
          secret key K  
Output: Plain-points P
1
, P
2, …, Pn  
1:       Generate an expanded key stream using the key    
             scheduling algorithm, as explained in Section 3.A. 
2:       For Round = 2 to 1 
3:              Generate O1, O2, …, On using the pseudorandom  
                    point generation algorithm explained in Section   
                    3.B. 
4:              For m =1 to  
5:                        
                            , as  
               explained in Section 3.C. In this step, O is  
               known and P is unknown. Using the  
               permutation mapping, the locations, where  
               the dimensional coordinates of P are  
               mapped into, are determined. Therefore, P′  
               and O′ are partially determined.     
6:                      For j = 1 to 8 
7:                            Consider the system of equations  
                                  generated by the inverse geometric   
                                  rotation of C
j+8(m−1)
  about O′j+8(m−1), and  
                                  determine the unknown coordinates of  
                                  P′j+8(m−1) and O′j+8(m−1), that are equal to  
                                  the unknown coordinates of Pj+8(m−1).   
8:                            Pj → Cj. 
9:                      End 
10:              End 
11:      End 
 
IV. DIMENSIONAL AND SPATIAL STABILITY 
A principal requirement for 3D content encryption is to 
ensure the dimensional and spatial stability of the original 
content. If such consideration is not taken into account, then 
encrypted objects may exceed the viewing screen resolution or 
they may collide with other objects of the virtual world. The 
literature review indicates that previous dimension and space 
preserving encryption schemes, such as [17], [18] and [19], 
attempted to provide stability in the form of a bounding box. 
However, from the cryptographic point of view, providing 
stability in the form of a bounding box is not an appropriate 
method for the encryption applications as it discloses the 
maximum dimensional coordinates of the plain point cloud. 
Therefore, this paper maintains the stability via bounding 
spheres, in which the maximum dimensional coordinates of 
the plain point clouds are not revealed. Given the radius of the 
bounding sphere, the adversary cannot correctly decompose it 
into vertex coordinates. Also, the size of the bounding sphere 
of the encrypted point cloud is adjustable, in that it can be 
made strictly smaller, but not greater than the size of the 
bounding sphere of the plain point cloud. This can improve the 
usability of the encrypted point cloud in 3D applications. In 
this section, we prove that the proposed encryption scheme 
maintains the stability of 3D objects. However, before we 
continue substantiating the stability of our encryption scheme, 
we firstly establish the notion of dimensional and spatial 
stability.  
To elaborate the stability notion, let P
1
, P
2, …, Pn be points 
of the plain point cloud P, and C
1
, C
2, …, Cn be points of the 
corresponding cipher point cloud C. Given a point cloud, 
denote by G the barycenter of the point cloud, and by r the 
distance from the farthest vertex to G. Any point cloud with 
(r, G) is encapsulated in a bounding sphere of radius r with 
center G. Therefore, the bounding spheres for the plain point 
cloud P and cipher point cloud C are characterized by (rP, GP) 
and (rC, GC), respectively. To avoid visual inconsistencies and 
therefore maintain the usability of the point clouds in virtual 
scenes, the encryption transformation should maintain the 
cipher-points within the bounding sphere of the plain point 
cloud; otherwise, the encrypted point cloud may overlap with 
other objects of the virtual world.  
Spatial stability implies that the encrypted point cloud is 
placed at the same location as the original point cloud. In other 
words, the center of the bounding sphere of the encrypted 
point cloud is positioned inside the bounding sphere of the 
plain point cloud. More precisely, ||GC – GP|| ≤ rP. Dimensional 
stability implies that the dimensional size of the encrypted 
point cloud is equal to or smaller than the dimensional size of 
the plain point cloud. In other words, the radius of the 
bounding sphere of the encrypted point cloud is less than the 
radius of the bounding sphere of the plain point cloud. More 
precisely, rC ≤ rP – ||GC – GP||.  
The notion of dimensional and spatial stability implies that 
stability is inclusive, that is, the bounding sphere of the 
encrypted point cloud is included in the bounding sphere of 
the original point cloud. In addition, if the enclosing sphere of 
the encrypted point cloud is included in the bounding sphere 
of the original point cloud, one can easily infer that the 
requirements for the dimensional and spatial stability are 
satisfied. Therefore, the dimensional and spatial stability of 
the cipher point cloud is maintained if and only if the 
bounding sphere of the encrypted point cloud is included in 
the bounding sphere of the original point cloud, that is, 
inclusiveness is equivalent to dimensional and spatial stability. 
We use the following lemmas to prove our claim (Theorem 1). 
Lemma 1. Given n random points P
1
, P
2, …, Pn within a 
sphere of radius r with center G ∈ ℝ3, let P′1, P′2, …, P′n be 
the result of permutation of dimensional coordinates of P
1
, P
2
, 
…, Pn. For any j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), ||P′j – G|| ≤ √3r. 
Proof. Permutation Π: X → X′ is an injective and surjective 
mapping that assigns elements of a finite set X of dimensional 
coordinates of P
1
, P
2, …, Pn to itself (a finite set X′ of 
dimensional coordinates of P′1, P′2, …, P′n). For any j (1≤ j ≤ n), 
||P
j
 – G|| ≤ r. Hence, dimensional coordinates of Pj can have a 
value between –r to +r. If permutation generates 3-tuples with 
maximal dimensional coordinates, such as (±r, ±r, ±r), then 
the maximal distance of P′j from G would be √3r.                  ■ 
Lemma 2. Given three distinct points P
1
, P
2
 and P
3
 in ℝ3, let 
P
3
 be the result of rotating P
1
 about P
2
 with an arbitrary angle. 
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If P
1
 and P
2
 are arbitrary points inside a sphere of radius r 
with center G ∈ ℝ3, then || P3 – G|| ≤ 3r. 
Proof. We start the proof by definition of a rotation. A 
rotation is a distance preserving transformation determined by 
the rotation center and Euler angles. To let the rotation sweep 
a larger area, the rotation distance ||P
1
 – P2|| should be 
maximized. To this end, P
1
 and P
2
 must be positioned 
diametrically antipodal on the surface of the sphere. By fixing 
the rotation distance, the rotation maps P
1
 to P
3
, which is 
located on the surface of a larger sphere of radius 2r with 
center P
2
. Figure 2(a) depicts the maximal space that P
3
 can 
appear. As shown in the figure, the maximal space is a 
bounded sphere of radius 2r with center P
2
. By the triangle 
inequality, the following relationship is hence true: 
||P
3
 – G|| ≤ ||P2 – G|| + ||P
3
 – P
2
|| = 3r.  (19) 
                                                                                       ■ 
Theorem 1. Given a plain point cloud P = {P
1
, P
2, …, Pn} 
bounded by a sphere of radius r with center G, the proposed 
encryption scheme maintains the dimensional and spatial 
stability of the corresponding cipher point cloud C = {C
1
, C
2
, 
…, Cn}. 
Proof. To prove this theorem, we need to measure 
dimensional and spatial deviations of the cipher point cloud 
from the plain point cloud. The proposed encryption algorithm 
is a combination of 3 consecutive procedures: a pseudorandom 
point generation process, a permutation process, and a 
geometric rotation process. Given n plain-points P
1
, P
2, …, Pn 
within a sphere of radius r with center G, the first encryption 
step generates n pseudorandom points within a sphere S of 
radius √3r with center G. According to Lemma 1, the 
permutation process generates a new set of points distributed 
in a sphere S′ of radius 3r with center G. By Lemma 2, 
random geometric rotations disperse the permuted points to a 
distance no more than thrice the radius of the sphere S′ from 
the center G. Figure 2(b) depicts the bounded spheres that 
every point may be mapped into after a random rotation. As 
shown in the figure, all spheres are located within a bigger 
sphere S′' whose radius is thrice the radius of the sphere S′ and 
center is G. Thus, the result of the geometric rotation process 
will be a set of points distributed within the sphere S′'. To 
control the boundary of the encrypted point cloud and 
therefore to ensure the dimensional stability of the point cloud, 
a scaling factor is utilized in the geometric rotation process. 
The result of this analysis is the same for any number of 
encryption rounds. This proves that given n plain-points P
1
, 
P
2, …, Pn within a sphere of radius r with center G, their 
cipher-points C
1
, C
2, …, Cn will be distributed in a sphere of 
the same radius with the same center. This meets the 
requirements for the dimensional and spatial stability, because 
the bounding sphere of the encrypted point cloud is included 
in the bounding sphere of the original point cloud. In other 
words, the bounding sphere of the encrypted point cloud is 
positioned inside the bounding sphere of the plain point cloud 
(spatial stability), and the size of the bounding sphere of 
encrypted point cloud is equal to or smaller than that of the 
plain point cloud (dimensional stability).                                ■ 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Fig. 2.  (a) The maximal space that a random rotation can disperse a point, (b) 
the boundary of the rotated point cloud. 
V. CRYPTANALYSIS 
In this section, we evaluate the security of the proposed cipher 
using cryptanalytic methods. Theoretically, the security level 
of a cryptosystem is dependent on its key length. In literature, 
there are various recommendations for the appropriate key 
length of a particular encryption system [28], [29], [30]. 
According to the guidelines released by the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology (NIST) [30], 128 bit key length 
is an acceptable margin for designing secure symmetric-key 
encryption algorithms until 2030. The proposed cipher uses 
six seed points to initiate the Chebyshev map. Considering the 
double precision 64-bit IEEE 754 format [31], a 64-bit number 
is represented using 1 bit for the sign bit, 11 bits for the 
exponent width, and 52 bits for the fraction precision. In this 
format, the exponent is biased by adding 1023 (= 
0b1111111111) before being stored. For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ 6), |ki| ≤ 
1. Hence, the most significant bit of biased exponent field 
always remains unchanged (equal to 0). However, the sign and 
the fraction parts use all their bits. Therefore, the key length of 
the proposed cipher is 378 (= 6 × 63) bits. Accordingly, the 
computational complexity of the exhaustive key search 
(ciphertext-only attack) is 2
378
. Table I compares the key space 
of the proposed cipher with a number of well-known 3D 
object encryption schemes, namely, the schemes by Shi et al. 
[16] and Technicolor [18], [19]. Compared to Shi et al.’s and 
Technicolor’s encryption schemes, the proposed cipher has a 
larger key space, which indicates a higher security level 
against brute-force attacks. 
 
 
TABLE I 
A COMPARISON OF KEY SPACE  
 
Scheme Key Space Analysis  
Shi et al., 2006 [16] 2128 
Technicolor, 2012 [18] and 2013, [19] 2192 
Proposed 2378 
 
To break the cipher, an adversary has temporary access to 
the encryption and decryption machinery, and so is able to 
make queries of certain behaviors and observe the 
corresponding output without the knowledge of the key. This 
may help the adversary to determine, or at least partially 
determine, the secret key. In addition, for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ 2n), 
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deducing the expanded keystream, that is, {𝑘1
𝑖 , 𝑘2
𝑖 , 𝑘3
𝑖 , 𝑘4
𝑖 , 𝑘5
𝑖 , 𝑘6
𝑖 }, 
is totally equivalent to finding the secret key whenever 
different point clouds are encrypted using the same secret key. 
Before we continue showing the security of our scheme, we 
firstly point out why simpler variants on the same idea are 
insecure, for example, if EK (P) = ∏ (𝐏)𝐾 , such as encryption 
schemes of [15], [18] and [19]. Choosing a permutation of 
large length size can exponentially increase the number of 
possible permutations #(π) of dimensional coordinates, that is,  
 
#(π) = (n!)3n, (20) 
 
where n is the number of 3D points. This exponential search 
space can make the statistical attacks cumbersome by 
increasing the size of a plain point cloud. However, 
permutation of a large number of coordinates, for instance, all 
of the dimensional coordinates at once, may not be an efficient 
solution because it can take a considerable amount of time to 
generate a cipher point cloud. In addition, permutation-only 
schemes are vulnerable to known/chosen plaintext attacks. In 
practical terms, only one pair of plain/cipher point clouds of n 
points with non-repeated coordinates is sufficient to uniquely 
determine the permutation mapping ∏ (⋅)𝐾  of length 3n. 
Another example is EK (P) = 
K
Rot (P). Given a pair of 
input/output point clouds (P, C), for any j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), Cj = Rj × 
[P
j
 − Oj] + Oj. To determine Rj3×3 and O
j
3×1, the adversary 
needs to solve the following system of equations: 
𝑐1
𝑗 = 𝑟11
𝑗 (𝑝1
𝑗 − 𝑜1
𝑗) + 𝑟12
𝑗 (𝑝2
𝑗 − 𝑜2
𝑗) + 𝑟13
𝑗 (𝑝3
𝑗 − 𝑜3
𝑗), 
𝑐2
𝑗 = 𝑟21
𝑗 (𝑝1
𝑗 − 𝑜1
𝑗) + 𝑟22
𝑗 (𝑝2
𝑗 − 𝑜2
𝑗) + 𝑟23
𝑗 (𝑝3
𝑗 − 𝑜3
𝑗), 
𝑐3
𝑗 = 𝑟31
𝑗 (𝑝1
𝑗 − 𝑜1
𝑗) + 𝑟32
𝑗 (𝑝2
𝑗 − 𝑜2
𝑗) + 𝑟33
𝑗 (𝑝3
𝑗 − 𝑜3
𝑗). 
(21) 
For any j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the adversary therefore requires only 4 
pairs of plain/cipher point clouds to construct a system of 12 
nonlinear equations and uniquely determine the unknown 
matrices, which are R
j
3×3 and O
j
3×1.  
Another variant is a one-round permutation-rotation 
structure, that is, EK (P) = 
K
Rot (∏ (𝐏, 𝐎)𝐾 ). To break this 
variant, for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the adversary 
needs to determine the permutation keystream πi and the 
unknown matrices, which are R
j
3×3 and O
j
3×1. Since permutation 
of dimensional coordinates is performed within the groups of 
8 plain-points and their corresponding pseudorandom points, 
the adversary needs to observe the 8 consecutive geometric 
rotations, that is, 8 systems of equations such as equation (21), 
at once. Due to the permutation process, for l (1 ≤ l ≤ 8), there 
are 48! different possible arrangements for the dimensional 
coordinates of  P
l
 and O
l
. Hence, there are 48! different 
possibilities for every 8 systems of equations. As explained 
above, for any j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), only 4 pairs of plain-points/ 
cipher-points is sufficient to determine R
j
3×3 and O
j
3×1. 
Therefore, the adversary can attack this variant by a known-
plaintext attack using 4 pairs of plain/cipher point clouds with 
the computational complexity of 48! = 2
202.9
 encryption. The 
complexity of this attack is much less than the exhaustive key 
search, that is 378. To reduce the complexity of this attack, a 
chosen-plaintext attack can be employed to reduce the search 
space for determining the permutation keystream. To this end, 
the adversary can exchange the indices of at least two points 
of the plain point cloud (point reordering attack [12]) and 
observe the changes which occur at the cipher point cloud. For 
any m ( ), ∏ :
{𝜋𝑖}𝑖=48(𝑚−1)+1
48(𝑚−1)+48 𝑋𝑚 → 𝑋𝑚
′ . In other 
words, every permutation is performed between dimensional 
coordinates of 16 points (8 consecutive plain-points and 8 
consecutive pseudorandom points) in Xm. Exchanging the 
indices (positions) of at least two points of the plain point 
cloud can, at most, affect the coordinates of 6 points of Xm. If 
these 6 affected points hold different indices, then, in the 
worst case, every 6 out of 8 points (= 75%) of the cipher point 
cloud would be affected by geometric rotation. To determine 
the permutation mapping of whole elements in every Xm, the 
adversary can repeat the point index shifting 8 times. This 
reduces the search space of permutation mapping from 48! to 
36!. As explained above, only 4 pairs of plain/cipher point 
clouds are sufficient to determine the geometric rotation. 
Therefore, this variant is broken by a chosen-plaintext attack 
with 12 pairs of plain/cipher point clouds and computational 
complexity of 36! = 2
138
 encryption. This attack is more efficient 
than the known-plaintext attack with complexity 202.9. 
Now we analyze the security of the proposed cipher (a two-
round permutation-rotation scheme), that is, EK (P) = 
K
Rot
(∏ (𝐏, 𝐎)𝐾 )
2. To break the cipher, for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3n) and j 
(1 ≤ j ≤ n), the adversary could employ a similar attack 
procedure explained for the one-round variant to determine the 
permutation keystream πi and the unknown matrices, which 
are R
j
3×3 and O
j
3×1. By observing every block of 8 consecutive 
plain-points separately, there are 8 consecutive geometric 
rotations of plain-points about pseudorandom points in each 
block. Mathematically, this is equivalent to 8 systems of 12 
non-linear equations. Due to the permutation procedure, these 
8 systems of equations can have 48! different arrangements in 
each round. Therefore, there are (48!)
2
 different arrangements 
for every 8 systems of equations after 2 rounds. Also, for any j 
(1 ≤ j ≤ n), 4 unknown matrices, which are Rj3×3 and O
j
3×1 in 
the first round, and R′j3×3, and O′
j
3×1 in the second round, need 
to be determined. As explained above, the adversary needs at 
least 8 pairs of known plain/cipher point clouds to determine 
the geometric rotation in both rounds. Therefore, the data 
complexity of the known-plaintext attack is 8 pairs of 
plain/cipher point clouds and its computational complexity is 
(48!)
2
 = 2
405.8
 encryption. This attack strategy (known-
plaintext attack) is less efficient than the exhaustive key 
search, and therefore, it is not feasible on the two-round 
permutation-rotation encryption scheme. To reduce the attack 
complexity, the adversary may use a point reordering attack 
(chosen plaintext attack) to reduce the search space for 
determining the permutation keystream. However, this 
approach does not work because exchanging the indices of 
two points of the plain point cloud can change the coordinates 
of 6 points of Xm by the first round and by the second round, it 
can change the coordinates of all points of Xm. Hence, the 
point reordering attack is not feasible on the proposed cipher 
and compared to the known-plaintext attack, it cannot reduce the 
search space for determining the permutation keystream. We 
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thus conjecture that the proposed encryption scheme is secure 
from known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks. 
VI. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Statistical analysis evaluates the statistical properties of an 
output stream of a cipher, independent of knowledge of the 
cipher structure. The failure in statistical tests indicates a bias 
in the cipher output, and hence, shows that it can be predicted 
from input. While having good statistical properties alone 
cannot guarantee the cryptographic security, statistical 
analyses are a compliment to cryptanalysis. In this section, we 
perform a number of tests, including a similarity analysis, a 
plaintext sensitivity analysis, a key sensitivity analysis, and a 
randomness analysis, to evaluate the statistical properties of 
the proposed 3D object encryption scheme. The evaluation 
consisted of both theoretical analysis and practical well-known 
experimentation. To perform the tests, we have chosen a 
number of plain point clouds from [32]. We also used different 
sets of keys to perform the tests: K = (0, 0.2, − 0.5, 0.9, − 0.8, 
0.1) as the original key and K′ = (0.1, 0.2, − 0.5, 0.9, − 0.8, 
0.1) as the slightly modified key.  
A. Similarity Analysis 
The ability of the adversary to have access to a number of 
plaintext and ciphertext pairs can help them to perform a 
similarity analysis between the plaintext and ciphertext, and 
therefore, obtain additional information about the encryption 
mapping. This may help the adversary to learn about the 
plaintext using the ciphertext information, without the 
knowledge of the secret key. To ensure the security of a 3D 
content encryption system, cipher objects must leak no 
information regarding the geometric structure of plain objects.  
A straightforward similarity analysis is the pairwise Euclidean 
distance between the points of the point clouds under study. 
This measure provides the point-wise similarity information of 
the point clouds. Given a set P of n points P
1
, P
2, …, Pn, for 
any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and  j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the Euclidean distance (2-
norm distance) between P
i
 and P
j
 is defined as follows [33]: 
𝑑(𝐏𝑖, 𝐏𝑗) = (∑ |𝑝𝑚
𝑖 − 𝑝𝑚
𝑗 |23𝑚=1 )
1
2. (22) 
For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the pairwise Euclidean distance dp 
between the corresponding points of two point clouds P and C is  
𝑑𝑃
𝑖 = d(Pi, Ci). (23) 
Clearly, if this diﬀerence is non-zero, then it shows that the 
encryption procedure scatters the plain-points to different 
locations. The pairwise Euclidean distance metric is a one-
dimensional method and cannot provide any information about 
the rigid similarity of surfaces (objects). Using such a one-
dimensional method for a multi-attribute analysis can lead to 
making wrong conclusions. Therefore, in addition to the 
pairwise Euclidean distance, we use the Hausdorff distance [34] 
to detect similar surfaces with rigid isometries, such as shifting 
and rotation. Let P and Q be two non-empty subsets representing 
two rigid surfaces (objects). For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ #P) and  j (1 ≤ j 
≤ #Q), the Hausdorﬀ distance is deﬁned as follows [34]:  
   ( , ) max sup inf , , sup inf , ,
Q PP Q
 P Q P Q
j ii j
H
i j i j
Q PP Q
d P Q d d
  

  
 
  
 (24) 
where sup represents the supremum and inf the infimum. The 
Hausdorﬀ distance determines whether P and Q represent the 
same rigid surface (object) or not. To measure the 
dissimilarity between the plain and cipher point clouds, a 
number of similarity experiments were performed. Figure 3 
depicts the results of a similarity analysis for a circular loop of 
10000 points with radius 2 and its cipher point cloud. A visual 
observation indicates that the encryption process pseudo-
randomly scatters plain-points into a limited space. It also shows 
that the encryption result of a circular, ring-shaped point cloud 
has a different shape (approximately ball-shaped). This 
observation verifies that the visual information (meaningful 
pattern) of the plain point cloud is completely damaged and a 
noisy aspect is observed. The result obtained from the pairwise 
Euclidean distance between the corresponding points and the 
Hausdorﬀ distance confirms the visual analysis. As shown in 
Figure 3(c), all points of the plain point cloud are displaced 
from their original location. For a better comparison, a sample 
of the plain point cloud with size 350 is depicted in a 2D plot 
(Figure 3(d)) along with its corresponding cipher point cloud. 
Figure 3(d) shows that the Hausdorff distance between the 
plaintext and ciphertext is the maximum minimum distances 
 
 
 
(d) 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) (e) 
Fig. 3.  Similarity analysis: (a) the plain point cloud, (b) the cipher point 
cloud, (c) the pairwise Euclidean distance between the corresponding points 
of the plain point cloud and cipher point cloud, (d) the Hausdorff distance 
between the plain point cloud and cipher point cloud, (e) the heat map of the 
distance matrix. 
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between the plaintext and ciphertext. The Hausdorff distance 
being non-zero shows that the plaintext and ciphertext clouds 
are dissimilar. Figure 3(e) depicts the heat map of the distance 
matrix, where entry (n, m) is the distance of the n-th point in the 
plain point cloud from the m-th point in the cipher point cloud. 
The visual summary given by the heat map suggests 
dissimilarity of the point clouds under study. In comparison 
with previous dimension and space preserving schemes, such 
as [15], [17], [18] and [19], our proposal has a better 
performance with regard to similarity analysis. For instance, 
given a point cloud of n vertices with zero coordinates, 
previous schemes ( [15], [17], [18] and [19]) render the same 
output while the proposed scheme generates a completely 
different point cloud.  
 
B. Plaintext Sensitivity Analysis 
In general, a desirable property for an encrypted point cloud 
is being sensitive to minor alternations in the plain point cloud, 
for instance, modifying only the position of one point. To 
study the relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext, the 
adversary may slightly change the position of one point in the 
point cloud and observe the changes in the encrypted point 
cloud. By this method, the meaningful relationship between 
the original point cloud and the encrypted point cloud can be 
found, which further facilitates in determining the secret key. 
If a small change in the position of one point in the original 
point cloud changes the position of a significant number of 
points in the encrypted point cloud, then the differential attack 
becomes practically infeasible. In the proposed cipher, each 
point is rotated randomly with respect to a random rotation 
reference which is calculated using the point cloud’s center of 
mass. A tiny change in the point cloud’s center of mass can 
affect the result of all random rotations, and therefore, it can 
result in a completely different cipher point cloud. For 
instance, if the cryptanalyst changes the position of one point, 
then the point cloud’s center of mass will be changed. This 
therefore changes the position of other points in the encrypted 
point cloud. This shows that the proposed cipher is sensitive to 
changes to the plaintext, and it is robust to differential 
cryptanalysis. This analysis is also confirmed by our 
simulation result shown in Figure 4. In this experiment, we 
have chosen Michael11, which contains 52560 points, as the 
plain point cloud and encrypted it using the original key. We 
also modified the plain point cloud by displacing 1 point by a 
distance 0.1% of radius r of the bounding sphere, and 
encrypted it using the original key. To observe the changes in 
the encrypted point clouds, scatter plots of the encrypted point 
clouds are depicted in Figures 4(b) and 4(d). For a better 
comparison, the pairwise Euclidean distances between the 
corresponding points of two plain point clouds and two 
encrypted point clouds are calculated and results are depicted 
in Figure 5. It can be observed that a small change in the 
position of even one point in the original point cloud will 
result in a significant change in the location of cipher-points. 
In addition to the pairwise Euclidean distance analysis, we 
also studied the impact of increasing the number of displaced 
points and the ratio of displacement on the dissimilarity 
 
 
                            (a)         (b) 
 
                (c)       (d) 
 
Fig. 4.  Plaintext sensitivity test result: (a) original plain point cloud, (b) 
encrypted point cloud from the original plaintext, (c) slightly changed plain 
point cloud by displacing 1 point by a distance 0.1% of radius r of the bounding 
sphere, and (d) encrypted point cloud from the slightly changed plaintext. 
 
  
(a) (b) 
 
Fig. 5.  Pairwise Euclidean distance between the corresponding points of (a) 
Plain point clouds and (b) Encrypted point clouds. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Log-log plot of the Hausdorff distance against the ratio of the spatial 
displacement. 
 
between surfaces of the cipher point clouds. To this end, we 
plotted multiple Hausdorff distance curves (Figure 6) by 
varying the ratio of modified points in the plain point cloud, 
that is, 1 point, 1% and 2% of points moved by a distance 
between 0.1% and 7% of radius r of the cipher object’s 
bounding sphere. The result of this analysis shows that the 
shape of the cipher point cloud alters by changing the number 
of altered points and the ratio of spatial displacement. This 
indicates that the plaintext sensitivity of the proposed scheme 
is a function of both the ratio of points changed in the plain 
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point cloud, and the ratio of displacement. Hence, any 
plaintext alteration within the plain point cloud not only 
changes the cipher-points but also changes the shape of the 
cipher point cloud. This indicates the robustness of our 
scheme to any differential analysis.  
In comparison with previous dimension and space preserving 
schemes, such as [15], [17], [18] and [19], our proposal is 
more sensitive with regard to small plaintext alterations. For 
instance, given Michael11 as the input point cloud, changing 
the location of only 1 point will only change one cipher-point in 
Pan et al.’s encryption scheme [15], and at most 3 cipher-points 
in Technicolor’s encryption scheme [18], [19]. It also has no 
impact on the rendered bounding box in Phelps’s encryption 
scheme [17]. In addition, such modifications do not change the 
shape of cipher point clouds by the encryption scheme of [15], 
[17], [18] and [19], and create similar cipher point clouds with 
zero Hausdorff distances. As explained in the cryptanalysis 
section (see Section 5), this can help an adversary to easily 
track the alterations and deduce the encryption mapping. 
C. Key Sensitivity Analysis 
A 3D content encryption scheme should be sensitive to 
changes to the secret key. In other words, a change in a single 
bit of the secret key should produce a completely different 
cipher point cloud. To test the key sensitivity of the proposed 
algorithm, a number of point clouds were encrypted using the 
original secret key and a slightly modified secret key. As it 
was not easy to compare the encrypted point clouds by simply 
observing them, the pairwise Euclidean distance between the 
corresponding points of two encrypted point clouds were 
calculated. Figure 7 shows the result of key sensitivity 
analysis for Centaur5 [32]. It is observed that two encrypted 
point clouds with a slightly different key are quite different. 
This indicates the high sensitivity of the proposed method to 
changes of the key. In comparison with previous encryption 
schemes, such as [15], [18] and [19], the proposed encryption 
scheme is more sensitive to the changes of the secret key. For 
instance, given a point cloud of n vertices with zero coordinates, 
changing the secret key creates the same point cloud by the 
encryption scheme of [15], [18] and [19], while the proposed 
cipher generates a completely different cipher point cloud. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Key sensitivity test result for Centaur5 [32]. 
D. Spatial Randomness 
To ensure the security of a 3D encryption system, the 3D 
cipher must have good probabilistic properties, one of which 
is random distribution. More specifically, the points of a plain 
point cloud are required to be dispersed as randomly as 
possible. This can annihilate any distinguishable patterns or 
shapes within the original object. This is desirable because the 
existence of any distinguishable pattern or relationship among 
the points of a cipher point cloud may lead to data leakage, 
which may help the adversary partially discover the plain 
object and hence break the cipher. Any competent adversary 
would attempt to acquire any knowledge from the point cloud, 
and therefore, would recognize any hidden pattern to then 
enable successful reconstruction of the surface. A primary 
analysis that an adversary may take into consideration is 
measuring the distance between each pair of points within the 
ciphertext cloud. The purpose of such analysis would be to 
cluster any existing pattern inside the ciphertext cloud, such that 
points in the same cluster have a small distance from one 
another, while points in diﬀerent clusters are at a large distance 
from one another. This may allow partial reconstruction of the 
surface from an unorganized point cloud. To resist such 
analysis, the cipher point cloud must be distributed as 
randomly as possible. Spatial randomness of cipher-points 
suggests that it would be hard to ﬁnd any clusters among so 
many pairs that are all at approximately the same distance.  
In a good point cloud encryption scheme, cipher-points are 
equally likely to occur at any location and the position of any 
cipher-point is not affected by the position of any other point. 
In other words, cipher-points occur within a given study 
volume with no apparent ordering of the distribution. 
Therefore, in comparison with plain-points, cipher-points are 
specific point events. This indicates that a good point cloud 
encryption scheme is synonymous with a homogenous three 
dimensional Poisson process. In this process, it is easy to 
verify that the mean and variance of the distance r of a 
randomly selected point to its nearest neighbor are 
 and , respectively, where ρ is the 
expected number of points per unit volume (intensity). For 
further information about the calculation of the model 
parameter values, that is, the mean and variance of r, please 
see [35] and [36]. 
To investigate the robustness of the proposed encryption 
scheme to surface reconstruction attacks, we evaluate the 
spatial randomness of cipher-points using the nearest neighbor 
method [37]. To this end, we use the Euclidean distance 
between the nearest neighbors as our statistic to study the 
spatial distribution of the cipher-point. For any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) 
and  j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), the nearest neighbor distance of point Pi, that 
is, the distance of point P
i
 to its nearest neighbor point in P, is 
defined as follows: 
 
𝑑𝑖 = min{𝑑(𝐏
𝑖, 𝐏𝑗)}, (25) 
where P
i
 and P
j
P, and i ≠ j. Taking the nearest neighbor 
distance as the statistic would violate the independence 
assumption of events in a Poisson process. One can easily 
observe that for any i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and j (1 ≤ j ≤ n), where i ≠ j, 
if P
i
 and P
j
 are mutual nearest neighbors, then di = dj. Thus, P
i
 
and P
j
 are clearly not independent. To resolve this problem, 
we consider the mean of nearest neighbor distances in a 
randomly selected subset of a point cloud, as follows: 
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?̅?𝑗 =
1
𝑗
∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑗
𝑖=1 .  (26) 
According to the Central Limit Theorem (CLT), under the 
spatial randomness hypothesis (null hypothesis) and for a 
sufficiently large sample point cloud with independently and 
identically distributed (iid) points, the mean of nearest 
neighbor distances ?̅?𝑗 must be approximately normally 
distributed, with the following mean and variance [38]: 
?̅?𝑗  ~ 𝑁 ( (𝜌)
−(
1
3
)
, 
0.3474
𝑗
(𝜌)−(
2
3
)).  (27) 
To construct the spatial randomness test, the sample mean 
?̅?𝑗 needs to be standardized. Under the spatial randomness 
hypothesis, the standardized sample mean, that is, , 
is calculated as follows: 
𝑍𝑗 =
?̅?𝑗−𝐸(?̅?𝑗)
𝜎(?̅?𝑗)
=
?̅?𝑗−(0.5540𝜌
−(
1
3))
√0.3474
𝑗
𝜌
−(
2
3)
.  (28) 
In the standard normal distribution, 
, Pr (Z  zα) = α. (29) 
Hence, according to the standardization procedure,  
.  (30) 
Equation (30) shows the significance of departure from 
random expectation. If the null hypothesis is valid, then Zj 
should be a sample from N(0,1). The null hypothesis is 
rejected if and only if . To interpret the test results, 
the P-value can be reported as follows:  
 /2 /2Pr ,value 2 ( )     Z zP z  (31) 
where Φ(⋅) denotes the cumulative distribution function. If P-
value < α, then the spatial randomness hypothesis of the cipher 
point cloud, that is, the null hypothesis, is rejected. To check 
the presence of any pattern in the point distribution of the 
cipher-text point clouds, we have applied the spatial 
randomness test on the ciphertext result of a number of 3D 
objects chosen from [32]. According to test results, for all 
cipher-text point clouds   and P-value > 0.05, 
which shows that with the standard significance level of α = 
0.05 the spatial randomness is not rejected and the encryption 
scheme under study passes the statistical test. This indicates a 
good statistical property of the encryption algorithm which can              
successfully dissipate any meaningful relationship between the 
points of the plain point cloud. Figure 8 shows the result of the 
spatial randomness test on Michael11’s cipher point cloud. To 
draw the histogram of mean nearest neighbor distances, 5000 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Sampling distribution of Z-values. 
samples of size j = 100 were selected, and the corresponding 
Z- values were calculated. As shown in the figure, the results 
of this simulated sampling scheme yield a distribution of Z-
values that is approximately normal. The mean of this 
distribution is −1.5258 and its P-value is 0.12705. This shows 
that no clusters can be identified within the cipher point cloud. 
Results of our analysis for the permutation-only encryption 
schemes, such as [15], [18] and [19], show that such schemes 
fail the spatial randomness test and they do not disperse the 
plain-points randomly into the bounded space. 
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In addition to security analysis, the encryption performance 
of 3D content is also an important factor to consider, 
especially for real-time applications which require a high level 
of efficiency. Generally, encryption performance hinges upon 
the structure of the central processing unit, programming 
language, memory size and the operating system. Since the 
proposed cipher is a symmetric algorithm, the encryption and 
decryption performance are the same. In this paper, to evaluate 
the performance of the proposed cipher, the encryption 
scheme was implemented using an un-optimized MATLAB 
code on a machine with Intel Core i5 2.5 GHz processor and 4 
GB of installed memory running under Windows 7. In 
addition, to having an accurate benchmark result, each timing 
test was executed 10 times and the average time was reported. 
The results of encryption time for encrypting 100 point clouds 
of various sizes (10
2
 to 10
5
 points) are presented in Figure 9. 
The encryption time is then used to calculate the throughput 
(encryption speed) of the proposed algorithm, that is, the point 
cloud size (number of points) divided by the encryption time. 
This analysis indicates that on average, the proposed cipher 
encrypts roughly 12196 points per second. Considering the 
double precision format, each point is stored using 3×64 bits; 
hence, the average throughput is 292.704 kilobytes per second. 
The computational complexity of the proposed cipher is the 
summation of complexities of the key scheduling algorithm 
and its three components: a pseudorandom point generation, a 
permutation, and a geometric rotation. The computational 
complexity of the key scheduling algorithm mainly depends 
on the implementation of the Chebyshev map. As determined 
by Brent and Zimmermann [39], the computational 
complexity of cosine function and its inverse can be calculated 
from log function and is O(M(a)log(a)), where M(a) is the cost 
of multiplication and a is the number of digits of precision. As 
a is determined by the computing system, both a and M(a) are 
fixed and independent of the input point cloud. Thus, they are 
constant terms. Accordingly, the computational cost of 
generating the chaotic keystream for two round encryption is 
12M(a)log(a)⋅n. The computational complexity of a 
pseudorandom point generation is a constant term. Hence, the 
computational complexity of generating 2n points is d ⋅ 2n, 
where d is a constant. The computational complexity of each 
permutation mapping and each geometric rotation is a constant 
term. As explained in Algorithm 1, the n input points are 
partitioned into  subsets of points. The permutation mapping 
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is firstly performed within every set of eight points and their 
corresponding pseudorandom points, and then all points of 
each set are geometrically rotated about their corresponding 
pseudorandom points. In each subset, the computational 
complexity of local permutations and geometric rotations is 
O(1). Therefore, the computational complexity of the one-
round permutation-rotation process is O(n). Accordingly, the 
computational complexity of the encryption algorithm is O(n). 
This complexity estimation is confirmed by our simulation 
result shown in Figure 9. 3D content protection schemes in 
[14], [15], [16], [18] and [19], have the same computational 
complexity as the proposed cipher, that is, O(n), where n is the 
number of points. However, as discussed earlier in the paper 
(Section 2 and Section 5), the scheme in [14] is not applicable 
to the point cloud representation, and schemes in [15], [18] 
and [19] cannot ensure the security of point cloud vertices. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  The encryption time of various sized point clouds. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
To overcome the limitations of the current techniques in 
addressing the confidentiality requirement of 3D objects, this 
paper proposes a technical solution for encrypting 3D objects. 
The proposed cipher, which is based on a series of random 
permutations and rotations, is compatible with standard file 
formats and maintains the semantic requirements of 3D 
objects, including the dimensional and spatial stability. Since 
the inverse of permutation and rotation matrices is their 
transpose, the implementation of the decryption scheme is 
very efficient. The cipher displaces the plain-points, and thus, 
deforms the geometry of the 3D object. This deformation 
preserves the dimensional and spatial stability of the original 
object. The security of the proposed cipher was convincingly 
verified by the evidence obtained from cryptanalytic methods 
and statistical analyses. The result of rigorous cryptanalysis 
indicates that the proposed encryption scheme is secure against 
known-plaintext attacks and chosen-plaintext attacks. The 
performed statistical tests include similarity analysis, plaintext 
sensitivity analysis, key sensitivity analysis, and spatial 
randomness analysis. The result of similarity analysis indicates 
that the plaintext and ciphertext clouds are not only dissimilar 
but also have dissimilar surfaces. It is shown that the proposed 
cipher is sensitive to changes of the plaintext and key, and is 
robust to differential cryptanalysis. The result of the spatial 
randomness test indicates that there is no appearance of 
homogeneous zones in the spatial distribution of the cipher 
point cloud. This shows that the proposed cipher disperses the 
plain-points randomly into the bounded space. Results of 
statistical analyses indicate that the proposed encryption 
scheme is robust against surface reconstruction attacks. In 
addition to security analysis, the performance of the proposed 
cipher was tested, and its efficiency for 3D object encryption 
was validated. Finally, a comparison with existing protection 
methods shows that the proposed cipher is more effective and 
has better security despite having the same level of 
computational complexity. 
The proposed encryption method maintains the location and 
boundaries of the encrypted content but it is blind to the 
existence of other nearby objects. Therefore, the plan for 
future work is to investigate more intelligent methods to 
control the distortion level of 3D content with respect to its 
environment. Another direction for further research is to 
investigate the security of the proposed method against more 
sophisticated techniques in both cryptography and computer 
graphics, which address 3D reconstruction of synthetic data 
under antagonistic conditions. Finally, supplementary methods 
are being investigated to extend point cloud based encryption 
methods to other 3D models, while preserving the application 
requirements of 3D content. 
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